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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant David Graves ("Graves")filesthis appealfroma decision of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County modifying the original custody
order regarding the parties' children and granting custody of the children to
Appellee Tricia Clements ("Clements"). This Court has jurisdiction over Graves'
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
HAD OCCURRED AND AFFECTED THE FUNCTIONING OF
THE CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRAVES AND
HIS CHILDREN?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
A TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS UNDERLYING A
HOLDING OF MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
IN A DIVORCE DECREE AND A DETERMINATION OF THE
CHILDREN'S BEST INTERESTS MAY NOT BE DISTURBED
UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. A COURT'S LEGAL

CONCLUSION AS TO WHETHER A MATERIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES HAS OCCURRED THAT WOULD
WARRANT RECONSIDERING THE DIVORCE DECREE IS
REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. ATRIAL
JUDGE'S AWARD OF CUSTODY AND SUPPORT IS ALSO
REVIEWED FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

AUTHORITY:

Cummings v.Cummings. 821 P.2d 472,476 (Utah App.
1991)
Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994)
Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992)

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no statutes or constitutional provisions that are determinative in
this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
Graves appealsfromthe trial court's order amending the parties'
decree of divorce. The amended order terminated the then-existing
joint custody order and awarded Clements the sole care, control
and custody of the parties' four (4) minor children. The trial court
6

found that the joint custody arrangement was "an extremely good
way of doing things," but that things have changed drastically"
since Clements remarried in March 1995.
Course of the Proceedings:
The parties were divorced April 7, 1992, in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County. The decree of divorce entered
into at the time dictated that the parties be awarded the joint care
and custody of the four minor children, and that Graves be the
primary caretaker and have the physical custody of the children
subject to Clements' rights of reasonable visitation. In August
1995, Clementsfileda petition to modify the divorce decree and
sought to gain physical custody of the children. On October 24,
1995, Commissioner Lisa Jones of the above-mentioned court
heard Clements' motion for a change of custody. After
interviewing the minor children, receiving proffers of testimony and
argument from counsel on Clements' motion for temporary order
and Clements' motion for independent custody evaluation, and
taking the contested issues under advisement, Commissioner Jones
ordered in a minute entry under advisement recommendation that
"it is in the best interest of the minor children to remain in the
physical custody of [Graves]." It was also found that "[Clements]
attempted to influence the children." A custody evaluation was
7

then ordered.
Disposition at Trial Court:
On October 17-18, 1996, Clements' Amended Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce came before the Third Judicial District Court,
the Honorable Judge Thorne presiding. In his order, Judge Thorne
held that "things have changed drastically resulting in the requisite
material change in circumstance . . . . [and] that the abovereferenced material change in circumstance occurred in March of
1995 when the Defendant [Clements] married Garry Waye
Clements." Judge Thorne terminated the existing custody order
and awarded Clements the sole care, control and custody of the
children.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
David Graves and Tricia Clements were married in Salt Lake City on
August 7, 1982. To their union were born Amy and David, twins - 12 years old,
Michael - 9 years old, and Daniel - 7 years old. Graves worked as an insurance
agent for New York Life Insurance Company and for ten years in the banking
industry. He left his job as an insurance agent in 1990 to return to the University
of Utah to earn his college degree. Graves and Clements arranged that Clements
would work while Graves completed his studies.
Around March 1991, Clements stated that she wanted a divorce from
8

Graves and moved out of the family home. (Transcript, p. 331.) As the reason for
the separation, Graves alleges that Clements had an extra-marital affair; she denies
this claim. (Transcript, p. 518-22.) The parties were divorced on April 7, 1992,
and they were awarded joint care and custody of the children, with Graves being
designated as the primary caretaker with physical custody, and Clements being
granted visitation rights. (Transcript, p. 183.) Clements was ordered to pay child
support, but did not meet her obligation and presently owes over $15,000 in past
due child support. (Transcript, p. 448-50.)
Since 1990, Graves has rented a three-bedroom apartment in a middle-class
neighborhood at 147 University Village, Salt Lake City. The apartment contains
its own kitchen and bathroom, and when the children lived with Graves, each child
had his or her own bed. The custody evaluator, Manuel de la Torre, L.C.S.W.,
toured the home and noted "it was fairly clean and orderly. The furnishings
appeared to be in good repair. The apartment has a common outside area with
swings, a merry-go-round and other play toys." (Custody Evaluation, p. 3.) For
six years the children lived with their father at the same address, attending the
same schools, and playing with the same friends. Graves received a total of $1,742
a month from AFDC, student aid and child support while he was in school.
Clements began living with Garry Waye Clements in June 1992.
(Transcript, p. 383.) Since that time, they have resided in a 5-bedroom home in a
middle-class neighborhood in West Jordan. (Transcript, p. 424, 437.) They were
married in March 1995.
9

In August 1995, Clements sought sole custody of the children byfilinga
petition to modify the divorce decree. On October 17-18, 1996, Clements'
Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came before the Third Judicial
District Court, the Honorable Judge Thorne presiding. During the trial, Graves
provided the court seven (7) separate character references supporting his skills and
abilities as a parent. The wide variety of references included: an LDS clergyman
relating his observations of Graves with his children, several University classmates
and professors commenting on Graves's dedicated efforts at school and his care
and concern for his children, and the director of the child care center where the
four minor children have attended since June of 1994, commenting that Graves
was "cooperative, sensitive to the children's needs, and kind and nurturing with the
children." In addition, Graves offered an affidavit from a neighbor, a registered
nurse who knew both Graves and Clements for eight years, stating that "Graves
has always possessed a calm, caring attitude toward his children."
The trial court found that the joint custody arrangement was "an extremely
good way of doing things," but that things have changed drastically" since
Clements remarried in March 1995. (See Transcript, p. 570-71.) The court found
that since that time, the joint custody co-parenting relationship had deteriorated.
The court specifically held that at the time of Clements' remarriage, Graves began
treating his relationship with her as a "f,tug-of-war,f" to see who would keep the
children. (Transcript, p. 571.) The court held that a material change in
circumstances occurred in March of 1995 when Clements remarried, and the court
10

terminated the joint custody order and awarded Clements sole custody of the
children.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah courts have clearly outlined the two-part procedure for modification
of child custody decrees. The first step involves a determination that a
"substantial" change of circumstances has occurred since the time of the last
decree, and the second step focuses on the best interests of the children. In this
case, the trial court incorrectly applied the first step of the test. The trial court
relied too heavily on the fact that Clements remarried, and ignored the effect the
bitter custody dispute had on the joint custody co-parenting relationship. The court
erred in allowing Clements to rely on circumstances she created by initiating the
custody battle. The artificially created "change in circumstances" is not sufficient
to remove the children from Graves and put them in Clements custody.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the requisite change must
substantially and materially affect the custodial parent's parenting ability or the
functioning of the custodial relationship. In this case, the evidence did not show a
material change in the custodial parenting relationship between Graves and the
children. Nothing "substantial" or "material" changed in David Graves'
relationship with his children to warrant Clements being awarded custody. Since
the original divorce decree, Graves and the children have lived in the same home
and attended the same schools and the same day care center. The only change in
11

this case is that Clements remarried and initiated a custody battle. The first test of
the Utah courts that the change must essentially affect the custodial relationship
was never met, and the trial court erred in awarding physical custody of the four
children to Clements.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING A
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED AND AFFECTED
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
GRAVES AND HIS CHILDREN. THE TRIAL COURT THEREFORE ERRED
IN MODIFYING THE CUSTODY ORDER.
The trial court erred by focusing on the fact that Clements remarried and
by ignoring the detrimental effect the child custody litigation had on the joint
custody co-parenting relationship. In doing so, the trial court misapplied
longstanding Utah case law on the subject, and therefore the custody modification
should be overturned by this court.
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the two-part procedure which trial
courts must follow in modifying custody arrangements. The trial court must first
"receive evidence only as to the nature and materiality of any change in those
circumstances upon which the earlier award of custody was based." Hogge v.
Hoggs, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (1982). The Utah Supreme Court revisited this first step
in Becker v. Becker, where it added "it is not sufficient merely to allege a change
which, although otherwise substantial, does not essentially affect the custodial
relationship . . . .[and] the asserted change must, therefore, have some material
relationship to and substantial effect on parenting ability or the functioning of the
12

presently existing custodial relationship." 694 P.2d 608, 610 (1984) (holding that
the trial court was justified in finding no substantial change in circumstances since
the divorce, despite fact that the former wife had matured, settled down and
remarried).
The reasoning behind the Supreme Court's rulings on this subject is clear.
The two-part procedure was designed "to protect the custodial parent from
harassment by repeated litigation and protect the childfren] from 'ping-pong'
custody awards." Hoggs, 649 P.2d at 53-54. "The rationale is that custody
placements, once made, should be as stable as possible unless the factual basis for
them has completely changed." Becker. 694 P.2d at 610. The Court in Hogge
noted that the Oregon courts emphasized c<the importance of a stable and secure
home life for children who are shifted from one parent to another and required to
make adjustments attendant upon such changes." LL at 54, quoting Remillard and
Remillard- 30 Or. App. 1111, 569 P.2d 651, 653 (1977). Moreover, "[t]he
'change of circumstances' threshold is high to discourage frequent petitions for
modification of custody decrees." Kramer v. Kramer. 738 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah
1987).
In the present case, the facts show that the custodial relationship between
Graves and his children did not substantially or materially change since the original
divorce. All the vital, relevant aspects of a child's life remained the same for the
Graves' children during this time. They slept in the same beds, lived in the same
home, attended the same day care center and schools, and played with the same
13

friends. More importantly, the parent-child relationship with their father did not
substantially or materially change during this time. And, although Clements has
remarried, "it is not sufficient merely to allege a change which, although otherwise
substantial, does not essentially affect the custodial relationship." Becker. 694
P.2d at 610. A noncustodial parent's change of circumstances is not relevant.
Kramer. 738 P.2d at 627.
It could be argued that in a joint custody situation, the circumstances of
both parents are relevant because both have a custodial relationship with the
children. However, such a position is inconsistent with Utah law. In Crouse v.
Crouse. 817 P.2d 836 (Utah 1991), the divorce decree provided for joint legal
custody of the parties' two children, and granted primary physical custody to Mrs.
Crouse. Seeking primary physical custody of the children, Mr. Crousefileda
petition to modify the divorce decree. In support of his petition, Mr. Crouse
offered evidence that he had moved from an apartment into a house. The trial
court denied the petition,findingthat Mr. Crouse failed to prove a material change
in circumstances sufficient to alter the custody order. The Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court and noted that a noncustodial parent's change in housing
arrangements is generally not sufficient to justify a modification of custody.
Crouse. 817 P.2d at 839-40. The Crouse decision illustrates that the Hogge change
in circumstances test applies in a joint custody situation, and the parent with
primary physical custody of the children is considered the custodial parent.
Accordingly, in the case at bar Clements had the burden to prove a material change
14

in the custodial parenting relationship between Graves and the children. The
evidence shows this burden was not met.
The court found that the joint custody parenting arrangement deteriorated
and broke down after Clements remarried in March 1995. However, the record
contains no evidence indicating that the breakdown in the co-parenting
arrangement was tied to or caused by Clements' remarriage. Clements has lived
with her new husband since 1992, and there is no evidence showing that her 1995
marriage affected the joint custody relationship. Rather, the evidence clearly
shows that the breakdown in the co-parenting arrangement was caused and
facilitated by the commencement of child custody litigation.
Graves testified that "the entire court case has created an artificial problem
here." (Transcript, p. 229.) He characterized the litigation as a "bitter court
battle," (Transcript, p. 230), and felt it appropriate that "under the circumstances"
he should not directly communicate with Clements regarding the children's welfare.
(Transcript, p. 191-92.) Graves stated that he used to have a very good coparenting relationship with Clements, and "that's the way it will be again when this
is all over." (Transcript, p. 212.) Graves also testified that "once the case is over
and settled, things will settle down and we can begin again." (Transcript, p. 201.)
Finally, Graves admitted that in the last year, because of the court case, he did not
involve Clements in decisions concerning attention deficit disorder (ADD)
counseling and medication for Michael or David. (Transcript, p. 270.) Prior to
the litigation, Graves involved Clements in every such decision. (Transcript, p.
15

270.)
The causal relationship between the beginning of the custody battle and the
breakdown of the co-parenting arrangement is illustrated by the timing of the
problems noted by the trial court. In the 1994-95 school year, Graves and
Clements shared custody of the children; each had them for 2 weeks per month.
(Transcript, p. 341.) They discontinued this system because it caused problems
with the childrenfs schoolwork. (Transcript, p. 342, 401.) Then, in August 1995,
Clements initiated the custody battle, and the co-parenting difficulties followed.
Beginning in October 1995, Graves refused to accept Clements' telephone
calls at home because they led to chaos with the children. (Transcript, p. 199-200,
343-44.) The court noted that Graves made a vulgar remark to Clements; this
occurred in June 1996. (Transcript, p. 197.) The school registration forms which
failed to include Clements were prepared in 1996. (Transcript, p. 202.) The
evidence showed a visitation problem occurred on June 14, 1996, and also on
August 11, 1996. (Transcript, p. 225-26.) According to Clements, her visitation
has not been very liberal since November 1995. (Transcript, p. 395.) Graves
testified that he has had almost no contact with Clements in the last 9 to 10
months, and that they handle matters through their attorneys. (Transcript, p. 21112.)
When considering the effect the bitter custody dispute has taken on Graves
and the joint parenting relationship, it is important to remember that Graves suffers
from chronic fatigue syndrome (Transcript, p. 213, 294), has been diagnosed with
16

depression (Transcript, p. 297-99), and is under significant stress. (Transcript, p.
299.) He admitted that all thefightingupset him and that he sometimes says
inappropriate things "in the heat of battle." (Transcript, p. 229, 234.) In fact, at
one point Graves even advocated splitting the children up for the purpose of
ending the litigation. (Transcript, p. 287.) It is obvious that the custody battle
Clements initiated has taken its toll on Graves and on the co-parenting relationship.
The evidence clearly shows that the breakdown in the joint custody
parenting arrangement was directly caused by the child custody litigation. The trial
court erred in allowing Clements to rely on and benefit from the problematic
circumstances she created by initiating the custody battle.
In Fullmer v. Fullmer 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988), the court
considered a similar situation. In that case, Mrs. Fullmer, the custodial parent, was
preparing to move to New York City and had quit her job, moved out of her
apartment, and sold most of her belongings. The night before her scheduled
departure, Mr. Fullmer served her with his petition to modify the child custody
order, together with a restraining order prohibiting herfromleaving the state.
Mrs. Fullmer was forced to hire an attorney and hurriedly arrange temporary living
accommodations and employment. The trial court modified the custody order and
awarded custody to Mr. Fullmer, based on his solid employment and more stable
environment. In reversing the trial court, the appellate court noted that although
Mrs. Fullmer's housing accomodations and employment were unstable after the
filing of the petition, "any changes in her circumstances were, in large part, a
17

consequence of respondent's [Mr. Fullmerfs] conduct." JsL at 948 The court
concluded that "Respondent [Mr. Fullmer] cannot use the circumstances he
created to reopen the child custody issue. To hold otherwise would provide
incentive to noncustodial parents to create havoc in the custodial parent's
circumstances in order to justify reconsideration of the custody award." LL at 948.
The same rationale applies to the present case. The breakdown in the joint
custody co-parenting relationship was a direct consequence of Clements' conduct
in initiating the "tug-of-war" custody battle. By commencing this emotionally
difficult litigation, Clements essentially facilitated the deterioration of the coparenting relationship. She cannot now rely on those circumstances to obtain
custody.

18

CONCLUSION
Because there was no change of circumstances which materially affected
the custodial relationship that Graves had with his four children, the trial court
erred in terminating the existing custody order and awarding Clements sole
custody. In addition, the trial court erred by allowing Clements to rely on the
negative circumstances she created by initiating the custody dispute. The trial court
misapplied Utah case law on the subject, and thus the amended order in this case
should be overturned.
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